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You Can Say That Again 
Stephen E .  Braude 
In this paper I shall address what strike me as a numer of related con­
fusions in the philosophy of language and logic. Although the discus­
sion will center around a certain analysis of tenses, what is more fun­
damentally at issue are widely-held views about meaning and the 
nature of agreement and disagreement. 
Consider the following puzzle. Most philosophers readily assume 
that 
( i )  Necessarily , sentences having different truth­
conditions express different propositions 
and also that 
( i i )  The truth-conditions of a tensed sentence are 
relativized to its time of production 
If ( i )  and ( ii )  are true, however, then it would seem as if a tensed sent­
enc.e produced at different times can never express the same proposi­
tion. But pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that the same tensed 
sentence (e.g. ,  'J .F.K. was assassinated, ) can, on different occasions, 
express (or mean ) the same thing. Hence, in some important sense of 
the term ' proposition' ,  it seems obvious that 
( ii i)  Sometimes, nonsimultaneous occurrences of a 
tensed sentence express the same proposition 
How should we deal with the apparent inconsistency in ( i )-( iii )? 
Part of what l shall argue is that as long as we want to understand 
how a real living language works, then the first statement in this triad 
should be rejected. Moreover, we shall also have to reconsider 
seriously a number of received ideas in the philosophy of language 
and logic. Specifically, I think we shall have to reject the view that 
( iv )  Tenses refer to times 
and also possibly that 
( v )  Propositions have truth-values. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most controversially, I believe that, if we 
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are ever to have a satisfactory understanding of natural languages, we 
will have to accept rwo related claims: 
( vi )  Sentences expressing the same proposition 
can have different truth-values 
( vii) Contradictory sentences can have the same 
truth-value. 
I 
For simplicity, let us consider only well-formed declarative sentence­
events ( tokens) tbe sentences. In other words, let us take a sentence to 
be an instance of a concatenation of morphemes, having truth­
conditions. The visual or auditory pattern of a sentence may (of 
course) be replicated, and let us think of a sentence and its replicas as 
instances of the same string of morphemes. Although I prefer here to 
regard sentences as events or tokens rather than types, I may occa­
sionally appear to treat sentences as types, as when I say that a sent­
ence has different truth-values or expresses different propositions at 
different times. This is merely a short cut for saying that a sentence 
and its replicas do not all have the same truth-conditions or express 
the same proposition. 
Of more central importance to this discussion is the notion of a 
proposition. But here, matters are more complicated. One aim of this 
paper is to address the question: What do sentences express? Let us 
agree that sentences do express things ( have meaning), and let us take 
our task to be that of determining what these things are. Moreover, 
since philosophers typically use the term 'proposition' to designate 
what a sentence expresses ( or can be used to express), it would be 
natural to rephrase our question as follows: What are propositions 
like? But I want to consider how to answer that question with an eye 
to the inconsistent triad above, and at this stage in the game it would 
be improper to answer it by appealing to any familiar view of proposi­
tions, much less the received view according to which statements ( i )  
and ( v )  above are true. After all, it is this received view i n  particular 
that I want to call into question. I suggest, therefore, that we try ( as 
much as possible) to return to a state of philosophical innocence and 
proceed as though there had never been a theory of propositions. 
Beginning afresh in this way, we will be forced to look at language use 
- and not the pronouncements of philosophers - for clues as to the 
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nature of what sentences express. ln fact, I shall henceforth avoid, 
when possible and appropriate, the term 'proposition', and simply say 
that sentences express chings. Hopefully. this will help us to clarify our 
intutions about what sentences express, by distancing us from a famil­
iar theoretical framework. It should also enable us better to under­
stand what it is for users of a natural language to agree or disagree with 
one another. 
But now that we are starting from scratch, so to speak, we can see 
one reason why I regard statement (i) in the original inconsistent triad 
as the most dispensable of the three. To begin with, statement (iii) is a 
fundamental pre-theoretic truth about language use, one which any 
theory of language must be compatible with. Although it contains the 
provisionally dreaded theoretical term 'proposition', ( iii) merely cap­
tures the ordinary language-user's intuition that successive replicas of 
a sentence can express the same thing. For example, when I say 
( l ) J. F. K. was assassinated 
I (or someone else) can later express what I earlier expressed by repli­
cating ( l ). Moreover, in some cases replicas of a tensed sentence pro­
duced many years apart can express the same thing - for example, 
( 1 )  produced now and 5 centuries hence. Among other things, this is 
how historians of different epochs can make the same observations 
abou� the past. 
Even less controversial is statement (ii), which is simply an abbre­
viated definition of 'tensed sentence'. It captures the feature of a cer­
tain class of sentences that sets members of that class apart from such 
expressions as '7 is a prime number', '2  + 2 = 4', and 'all bachelors 
are unmarried'. The timelessness of these latter sentences, as I have 
argued elsewhere ( Braude, 1 97 3 ), is best understood in terms of the 
invariance of their truth-conditions over time. 
Moreover, not only are ( ii) and { iii) antecedently plausible and rela­
tively non-theoretical, they are also empirically supportable. One rea­
son we know (ii) to be true is that we know how language-users assign 
truth-values to tensed sentences, and we know that such assignments 
depend on when, relative to those sentences' times of production, 
what is said to occur in fact occurs. And we know that (iii) is true, 
first of all, because language-users believe themselves able to re­
express what they or others have previously expressed, either with dif­
ferent sentences or by replicating the sentence( s) used earlier. To sup­
pose that one is never correct in such beliefs is simply to confuse 
speaking a natural language with some more esoteric form of linguistic 
activity. Furthermore, if { iii) were false, if we could never re-express 
what we or others expressed previously by replicating the sentences 
used earlier , then our natural languages would not serve the urgent 
human needs that motivated their development in the first place, and 
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they would not be usable by small children and idiots ( see Braude, 
1 976). 
Statement ( i ), by contrast is wholly theoretical and non-empirical ; 
it is a component of a philosophical theory of language. But the 
adeq uacy of any theory of language, I submit, depends in part on 
whether it is compatiable with (i i i ) .  On the surface, of course, it 
appears that ( i )  and ( ii i)  are blatantly incompatible, given the truth of 
( ii ) . And as I shall argue below, the maneuvers required to reconcile 
( i )  and ( i ii ) involve adjustments to ( iv) which are far from convincing. 
In fact,  a misguided allegiance to ( i v )  may lie at the root of the whole 
problem. 
[I 
One reason those who accept 
( ii )  The truth-conditions of a tensed sentence are 
relativized to its time of production 
are incli ned to accept 
( i )  Necessarily sentences having different truth­
conditions express different propositions 
is that in addition to ( ii )  they also accept 
( iv) Tenses refer to times. 
The idea behind ( iv) is that the indexicality of tenses is reflected in 
what a tensed sentence expresses, j ust as the indexicality of the 
personal pronoun is reflected in what ' I  am hungry' expresses ( for 
example, as produced by different people). Many philosophers 
maintain that an ordinary tensed sentence without an explicit 
temporal demonstrative contains a reference to a certain time or 
times, simply in virtue of being tensed. For example, what 1S is now 
O' expresses through the use of the demonstrative ' now' , 1S is 0' is 
supposed to express simply in virtue of being in the present tense. 
That is why the demonstrative in the former sentence is regarded as 
superfluous; 'S is 0' is already supposed to contain a reference to the 
present. Similarly, the past and future-tense sentences 'S was 0' and 
1S will be 0' are supposed to contain references respectively, to times 
before and after the present, even though they contain no explicit 
singular terms referring to those times. 
Various systems of tense logic display their allegiance to 
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this general approach to tenses by defining tense operators in terms of 
a chronological logic, such as Prior-type UT -calculus ( see, e.g. , Prior, 
1967,  1 968; also Rescher and Urquhart, 1 97 1  ). For example, where 
' Uab' is 'instant a is earlier than instant b\ 'TaA ' is 'formula A is true 
at instant a' ,  and where 'n' is a constant for 'now', the past-tense 'PA' 
(to be read, 'it was the case that A') is often defined as '(3t) (Um & 
TtA )'. 
If we ask 'What is the present to which a tensed sentence implicitly 
refers?', a natural first answer might be to expand (iv) as follows. 
(iv') The tense of a sentence refers to an interval 
coterminous with the sentence's time of 
production. 
But then we can see why it would be difficult from this perspective to 
explain how replicas of 
( 1 )  J .F.K. was assassinated 
(2 ) Jones is feding tired 
produced at c, can express the same thing as replicas produced later at 
c'. For example, at c , (2 ) would express whatever is expressed by the 
presumably tenseless sentence 
(2' ) Jones (is] feeling tired at t 
while at t ' it would be equivalent instead to 
(2 .. ) Jones (is] feeling tired at c' . 
Some have endeavored to sidestep this problem by arguing that the 
tense of a sentence refers to more than the sentence's time of produc­
tion. Specifically, they would amend { iv') to read 
(iv .. ) The tense of a sentence refers to the senten­
ce's specious presenc 
A sentence's specious present is a variable interval; its length, or 
extremities relative to a sentence's time of production, may change 
from one context to another. Hence, a sentence's specious present 
may be a short interval on one occasion and a long interval on 
another. Moreover, on some occa.5ions the specious present for a 
sentence may lie mostly in that sentence's future (or past) ,  while on 
other occasions it may extend equally into the sentence's past and 
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future. Bur given that the specious present for a tensed sentence vanes 
in these ways, nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence can con­
tain references co the same specious present, an interval including all  
the times of production of those replicas. And since successive repli­
cas of a tensed sentence can contain references to the same specious 
present, those replicas can express the same thing, despite being pro­
duced at different times. 
Tyler Burge has advanced a sophisticated and provocative version 
of this view (see Burge, 1974 ). He observes that a sentence like 
( 3 )  My body is too weak for dancing 
can be used appropriately as an answer not only to the question 'Why 
aren 'c you dancing?', but also t0 'Why didn 'c you attend the dance las1 
momh?'. This suggests to Burge that the interval referred to in ( 3 )  as 
the present can vary from replica to replica. In answer tO the first 
question, that interval might be considered relatively short - say, 
that evening (the speaker might just have given blood ). Bur in answer 
to the second question, the interval referred to as the present extends 
into the previous month. Moreover, since we are presumably free to 
choose any interval we like as the present, Burge believes we can 
choose the same interval at different times and thereby express the 
same proposition with nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence. 
In my view, however, allegiance to (iv) only makes it more difficult 
to understand how nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence 
could express the same proposition. Consider, for example, replicas 
of 
( 4) Plato is buried in Athens 
produced now and shortly after Plato's death. On the view under con, 
sideration, if these temporally remote replicas of ( 4) express the same 
thing, it is because they contain references to the same specious pres, 
ent. But how does it happen that the speakers of these replicas con, 
sider the same interval to be the present? How, in fact, does a speaker 
select a specious present for his tensed sentences? Are we to suppose, 
for example, that the producer of ( 4 )  in antiquity regarded the present 
for that sentence as a period extending more than 2 ,000 years into the 
future? Would it be impossible for us now to express with ( 4 )  what 
that sentence .expressed after Plato's death, if the ancient speaker con, 
sidered the present to extend only to 1 968? 
The problem with using (ivH) to resolve the apparent inconsistency 
in ( i )-(iii) is that it presupposes a bizarre picture of language use. In 
order to explain how nonsimultaneous tensed sentences can express 
the same thing, it must endow speakers of a natural language with 
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extraordinary good luck and a preposterous historical perspective. For 
me to express the same thing with a tensed sentence as earlier (or 
later) speakers express with their replicas, not only must I regard the 
specious present for my sentence as sufficiently extensive to include 
those other times, but the producers of the other replicas must regard 
the present for their sentences as the same interval I take to be the 
present. Now of course we do not know the entire history (including 
the future history) of language use. Hence, we do not know, at the 
time of speaking, when earlier or Later replicas of our sentences are 
produced, or when producers of that (or other) sentences express 
what we are expressing. And since we do not, as a rule, communicate 
with each other about our choice of specious presents, we certainly do 
not know what speakers of those other sentences take to be the spe­
cious present. But then if (iv"') is true, whether or not nonsimultane, 
ous tensed sentences express the same thing is completely fortuitous. 
But of course it is not fortuitous; in fact, a natural language would be 
a total failure if it were. 
Besides, it is perfectly clear that considerations concerning the 
length of specious presents do not intrude on our use of ordinary 
tensed sentences. For example, in saying 
( 1 )  J_F.K. was assassinated 
we don't need to worry about the extent of its specious present, lest 
our decision prevent some future speaker of ( 1 )  from expressing what 
we expressed. In fact, we simply don't think at all about specious 
presents when using our language. But it is difficult to see how a view 
like Burge's could be true unless speakers of ordinary tensed senten� 
ces frequently engaged in considerations concerning specious presents. 
And it is absurd to suppose that such a complicated selection of 
intervals of time is a process or activity that occurs automatically, or 
without conscious deliberation. Indeed, it is imperative that speakers 
know what the specious present for their sentences is, if they are ever 
to know when they've succeeded in expressing what they or others 
express. 
Although I regard the above considerations as sufficient to subvert 
the view that tenses refer to a specious present, I want to consider 
some additional difficulties facing those who would use it to reconcile 
our original statement ( i )  with (ii)  and (iii). The importance of these 
further problems is that they direct our attention to some fascinating 
and (to my knowledge) hitherto undiscussed features of tenses and 
their role in communication.1 They also provide a further illustration 
of just how far allegiance to (iv) takes us from an accurate account of 
the use of natural languages. 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 17 [1986], No. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol17/iss1/4
66 Stephen E. Braude 
III 
The issues I want now to examine can best be intrcx:iuced by consider­
i ng some cases. 
Case 1 :  l am attending a party with my friend Jones, who ( I  happen 
to lc now) has had an extremely exhausting day . At one point I notice 
that Jones is ncx:iding off to sleep in a comfortable chair. Turning to 
my host, I remark, 
( 2 )  Jones is feeling tired 
But suppose that my host is unable to see Jones dozing in the chair. 
Believing him to be well rested, he says to me , 'You must be mis­
taken' .  But I shalce my head and reply, 'Jones is feeling tired' .  
I realize that speakers are rarely so boring as to repeat exactly the 
same words used previously, when trying to express again what they 
earlier expressed. In real life I probably would not have replicated ( 2 )  
exactly i n  response to my host's incredulity. I would instead have 
chosen another sentence to express what I earlier expressed with ( 2 )  
- for example, 'Jones is wiped out' 'Jones is exhausted',  or ( in defer­
ence to my host's ego) ' I  know you seldom err, but Jones is feeling the 
effects of a rough day '.  But apart from this convenient artificiality, we 
have here a paradign case of nonsimultaneous tensed sentences 
· expressing the same thing. In ordinary discourse, of course, that sort 
of agreement seldom occurs simultaneously; people agree with them­
selves or with others on separate occasions. And in the situation we 
are imagining here, it is clear that by replicating ( 2 )  my intention was 
to express what I expressed previously. It is not a case in which I 
wanted merely to report the sentence I had uttered previously, as 
though I might no longer wish to be claiming that Jones is feeling 
tired. If that had been all I wanted to do, it would have been more 
appropriate to say, 'What I said was . . .  ' .  
Case 1 ,  then is just the sort of case which partisans of ( iv'"') believe 
they can explain. Let us say that my first replica of ( 2 )  was produced 
at moment M, and that my later replica was prcx:iuced at M'. Cham­
pions of the specious present would claim that the two replicas of ( 2 )  
express the same thing because they each refer to the same specious 
present, some moment M"' which includes moments M and M'. 
Now an ordinary present-tense sentence 'S is 0' is true just in case 
S is 0, not simply during the interval regarded as the present ( i .e . ,  at 
some time or other during that interval) ,  but throughout the present. 
At the very least this is true of ( 2 )  in this case. In real life, had I 
wanted to express, for example, the more cautious and complicated 
proposition typically expressed by 'Jones is feeling tired at some time 
during the present', I would not have prcx:iuced as simple a sentence 
as ( 2  ). And we may suppose that I had no reason to expect Jones' 
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condition to undergo any sudden or rapid change. Hence, there would 
be no reason for me to say anything more circumspect than 'Jones is 
feeling tired'.  Presumably, then, defenders of ( iv' ) would take the two 
replicas of ( 2 )  to have the same truth-conditions; that is how they 
would explain the fact that the replicas express the same thing. Both 
sentences would be considered true just in case Jones is feeling tired 
throughout M'. 
But now let us suppose that ber� M and M' a powerful amphe­
tamine that Jones had ingested several minutes beforehand suddenly 
takes effect , so that by the time I replicate ( 2 )  at M', Jones is brim­
ming with energy . What truth-values should we then assign to my two 
replicas of 'Jones is feeling tired '? I submit that we should take the 
first replica ( produced at M ,  before Jones feds the effect of the drug) 
to be true, and the second ( produced after Jones' resurgence of 
energy ) to be false. In this case, I think we should say that although I 
expressed the same thing at M and M', nevertheless the sentence I 
produced at M is true, while the sentence I produced at M' is false. In 
this way we can capture what is semantically peculiar about the case, 
while still respecting what seemed initially to be correct about it -
namely, that I expressed at M' what I expressed earlier at M. After all, 
that is what seemed to be obvious about my verbal performance at M' 
before learning about the amphetamine. And I submit that this extra 
bit of information should not alter our assessment of what I expressed 
at M'. Whether or not Jones felt the effect of an amphetamine is 
completely irrelevant to determining whether I expressed at M' what I 
expressed earlier at M. Recall that, ex hypothesi ,  I had no knowledge at 
M and M' that Jones had taken an amphetamine, and so that fact cer­
tainly did not enter into my consideration at those times. 
But notice that we cannot analyze the case this way on the view 
under consideration. According to the view of language embracing ( i )  
and ( iv"'), both replicas o f  ( 2 )  have the same truth-conditions, and 
necessarily, any two sentences having the same truth-conditions have 
the same truth-value. Therefore, by insisting that nonsimultaneous 
tensed sentences express the same thing in virtue of referring to the 
same specious present, this account of tenses and their role in agree­
ment fails to allow for changes in the world to correspond to changes 
in truth-value assignments to tensed sentences. And that difficulty 
seems especially enbarrassing in view of the fact that one of the most 
interesting features of tensed sentences is that most such sentences can 
change in truth-value with time.2 
Case 2: This case should be especially useful for those who can 
detect contradictory sentences more easily than sentences expressing 
the same thing. The scene is later at the party mentioned in case 1 .  
Jones, feeling the effect of the amphetamine, is circulating among the 
guests with great zest and conviviality. During this time, two party­
goers engage in conversation. The first, A, having last seen Jones 
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asleep in the easy chair, and believing him still to be asleep, says to B, 
' Have you seen Jones? ' .  B, having last seen Jones involved in an ani­
mated discussion in the ktichen, and believing him still to be in that 
room, says (at M )  ' Yes. Jones is in the kitchen ' .  A, understandably 
incredulous, and al.so mindful of B's reputation as a practical joker. 
replies 'Jones is noc in the kitchen '. 
Now first of all, this is surely a paradigm case of the occurrence of a 
pair of contradictory sentences in ordinary discourse. For one thing, 
the members of such sentence-pairs are hardly ever produced simul­
taneously. One would think, then, that any remotely adequate analy­
sis of contradictory tensed sentences would not be stymied by the fact 
that they are produced at different times. Interestingly, however. this 
is precisely where the traditional accounts of contradictories go awry. 
To bring their stark artificiality clearly into the open, consider the fol­
lowing additional features of case 2 .  Suppose that when B says 
( 5 )  Jones is in the kitchen 
Jones is in the kitchen but that when A says 
(6)  Jones is not in the kitchen 
Jones had returned to the living room. 
How are we now to understand this case? First of all, I submit that 
knowledge of Jones' whereabouts is irrelevant to determining whether 
( 5 )  and (6)  are contradictories. It is obvious that A is denying what B 
expressed; that was clear before I mentioned where Jones was. But it 
also seems as if each of their sentences is true. Jones is in the kitchen 
when B utters ( 5 ), and is not in the kitchen when A utters ( 6 ). But 
then contrary to the received view of contradictories, it seems as if the 
contradictoriness of ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  is independent of the truth-value 
assignments we make to the sentences. 
It seems ironic that defenders of ( iv"' ) should have difficulty han­
dling nonsimultaneous contradictories. Presumably, they would 
accept the received view that contradictories must have different 
truth-values. And in order to assign opposing truth-values to ( 5 )  and 
( 6 ), they would relativize the sentences' truth-conditions to the same 
specious present M". ( 5 )  would be true, I suppose, just in case Jones 
is in the Kitchen throughout M". But what are the truth-conditions of 
( 6 )? Is ( 6 )  true just in case Jones is not in the kitchen throughoutM"'? 
The problem is that this statement of ( 6 )'s truth-conditions is ambig­
uous. It could be stating the truth conditions of either 
11
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(6') Jones is not in the kitchen at some time during M' 
(6 ... ) Jones is not in the kitchen at any time during M"' 
Now if ( 5 )  is true just in case Jones is in the kitchen rhroughour M ... , 
then one would think that A's denial of ( 5 )  would have the truth, 
conditions of(6"' ) - i.e., that his sentence (6) has the force of 
( 7)  Jones is in a different room (throughout M"') 
or 
( 8 )  Jones is out of the kitchen ( throughout M"') 
But in that case ( 5 )  and (6) need not have opposite truth,values. In 
fact, if Jones is in the kitchen for only parr of M"', both sentences are 
false. Only if (6) is understood to have the truth-conditions of (6') 
must ( 5 )  and ( 6) have different truth,values. Unfortunately, however, 
this seems to require an arbitrary difference in the way we interpret 
( 5 )  and (6). We don't take ( 5 )  to mean 'Jones is in the kitchen at 
some time during M"' ' . And I submit that it would be suspicious in 
the case described to give (6) the truth--conditions of (6'). (6) does 
seem to have the force of something like (7)  or (8), and the case does 
seem to require that we give parallel analyses of the truth-conditions 
of ( 5 )  and ( 6 ). 
But can it be acceptable, my opponent might wonder, to allow sen­
tences expressing the same thing to differ in truth,value, and to allow 
contradictory sentences to have the same truth,value? I grant that at 
first this might seem like a crazy thing to take as a given about ordi­
nary language, since it seems to call into question much of a 
deservedly well,entrenched theoretical framework in logic. But it 
doesn't seem so outrageous when we reflect that we are dealing with 
nonsimultaneous pairs of sentences. For example, the traditional and 
familiar notion of contradictories applies to sentences abstracted from 
the temporal restrictions placed on their truth-conditions. But then 
there is no reason to expect that this venerable notion of contradicto-­
ries will apply to the richer notion of a iensed sentence. Since tensed 
sentences can be adequately understood only in a temporal context, 
and since they do have their truth,conditions relativized in some way 
to their times of production, it is not surprising that nonsimultaneous 
contradictory tensed sentences can have the same truth,value. A satis­
factory analysis of a tensed natural language simply requires a notion 
of contradictories different from the standard Aristotelian notion. So 
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long as we are concerned with the temporal aspects of language ( a nd 
tensed sentences in partic ular), the concept of contradictories can no 
longer be explai ned in terms of opposing truth-values. M y  suspicion is 
that an adequate notion of contradictories for an analysis of natural 
languages will be (at least partly) pragmatic rather than wholly seman­
tic. Perhaps it will have to be spelled out in terms of such things as 
intentions, presuppositions, or even Gricean implicatures. I am there­
fore, not renouncing our logical framework . Rather, I am suggesting 
only that its application has certain hitherto unacknowledged limita­
tions. Still, it is definitely an e mbarrassment to the standard accounts 
of tenses that they fail to represent these interesting features of 
language. 
Nevertheless, I imagine that few will be easily swayed to my point 
of view. Most will be tempted to try to explain away the anomalous 
situations characterized above rather than scuttle or severely limit the 
use of familiar and otherwise apparently viable logical tools. But I 
think this would be a mistake. In fact, it may succeed only in creating 
additional serious problems. To see why, consider the following chal­
lenge to my remarks about cases 1 and 2 above. 
Some might urge that it was wrong from the start to claim that I 
expressed the same thing both times I uttered 
( 2 )  Jones is feeling tired 
They would contend, quite sensibly , that person B can agree with per­
son A even though A and B do not express the same thing. For exam­
ple, in case 1 ,  some might argue that the respect in which I agree with 
myself when I repeat ( 2 )  is that my later remark abbreviates a sent­
ence like 
(9) Jones was feeling tired then [ i .e . ,  when I 
uttered the first sentence] and still is 
In that case, I would have been uttering an implicit conjunction the 
second time, and the reason my sentence is false at that time is simply 
that the second conjunct is false. 
Now while I agree that some cases of agreement can be handled 
along these lines, many - including case 1 - cannot. First of all, I 
don't think we would have been inclined to understand my sentence 
at M' this way before learning about the change in Jones' condition. 
And remember, ex hypothesi, neither my host not I knew Jones had 
taken an amphetamine. Any my host didn't ask me ( say ) whether 
Jones' condition was stable; he was incredulous about my assessment 
of Jones' present condition. Hence, the correct interpretation of my 
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second sentence is what l think would have been our initial interpreta­
tion - namely, that I expressed about Jones neither more nor less 
than what I expressed earlier. 
Moreover, it is preposterous to claim that people cannot express 
the same thing with nonsimultaneous tensed sentences, simply 
because the sentences are produced at different times. A language with 
that feature would be a failure as a natural language. Human languages 
are presumably designed to facilitate communication, not to force it 
into convoluted patterns satisfying the canons of old-fashioned logical 
analysis. Barring cognitive or linguistic limitations, we can express 
whatever we want, whenever we want. The passage of time imposes 
no limits on what we can express; nor does it limit what we can say 
using the present tense. The passsage of time may, however, deter­
mine what can be said truly. 
Apparently, then, by trying to explain away the odd features of 
cases 1 and 2, we return to the implausible position which earlier 
forced us to consider the view that tenses refer to a specious present. 
The problem with the initial interpretation of ( iv) - i.e.,  (iv') - was 
that it could not help explain how nonsimultaneous tensed sentences 
could express the same thing. We accordingly modified that view by 
understanding the time referred to as a specious present. But that view 
still left it a mystery how speakers could agree on a specious present, 
and it also could not explain how tensed sentences expressing the 
same thing could differ in truth-value, and how contradictory tensed 
sentences could have the same truth-value. And now, in order to 
explain away these interesting (and unheralded) facts of ordinary lan­
guage, proponents of the referential analysis of tenses seem forced to 
retreat back to the deeply unsatisfactory view that nonsimultaneous 
tensed sentences necessarily express different things. 
The view that tenses refer to times thus appears to be far less attrac­
tive than we might have thought initially, and seems to lead to 
extremely implausible descriptions of ordinary discourse. What, then, 
are we to make of the cases thought by many to support the referen­
tial analysis? Let us now turn our attention to that topic. 
IV 
One kind of case apparently supporting a referential analysis of tenses 
is exemplified by Burge's example 
( 3 )  My body is too weak for dancing 
As we observed earlier, ( 3 )  can be used appropriately as a reply not 
only to ' Why aren't you dancing? ' ,  but also to ' Why didn't you 
attend the dance last month?' .  Since ( 3 )  can serve as an answer to this 
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second question, Burge and others conclude that the pre.senc referred 
to in ( 3 )  can extend a month into the past. 
This line of reasoning conceals several mistakes. The first is the 
failure to see that even if ( 3) does implicitly contain a reference to a 
time, we are not compelled to attribute that referring role to its tense 
structure. Since this mistake figures also in another case discussed 
below, I will postpone my comments about it until then. 
A second mistake may simply � the failure to remember that the 
grammatical and semantic tenses of a sentence need not be the same. 
For example, suppose you aslc the grocer about the price of his fruit, 
and he replies, 
( 1 0 )  Those melons will be 89 cents each 
Although this sentence is grammatically inflected in the future tense, 
it is clearly a present-tense sentence semantically. Or suppose I ask 
you, 'What are you doing tomorrow?' ,  and you reply 
( 1 1 )  I 'm flying to Chicago 
Your reply should clearly be understood to be in the future tense, 
even though your sentence is grammatically inflected in the present 
tense ( this particular discrepancy between grammatical and semantic 
tenses is, of course, common in German ). 
Similarly, I suggest that ( 3 )  is not a semantically present-tense sen­
tence, or at least not only a semantically present-tense sentence, as an 
answer to 'Why didn't you attend the dance last month?' .  In that case 
( 3 )  might plausibly be understood as equivalent to one of the 
following. 
( 1 2 )  My body was too weak for dancing and still is 
( 1 3 )  My body is often (or is usually) too weak for dancing 
( 1 2 )  is a conjunction of a past- and present-tense sentence, and ( 1 3  ), 
whose principal temporal operator is ' It is often ( or usually) that case 
that . . .  ' ,  clearly has truth-conditions more complicated than those for a 
simple present-tense sentence. 
In any event, that ( 1 2 )  and ( 1 3 )  are indeed plausible translations of 
( 3 )  in this case reminds us that what a sentence expresses is partly a 
function of the way it is embedded in a bit of life. That is why we can 
know what a sentence expresses only after knowing certain facts about 
the sentence's context of production. That is also why many sentences 
of ordinary language can be paraphrased in certain contexts by longer 
and more explicit sentences. Hence, when Elmer Fudd says 'She 
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waved at him', he might be expressing what those of us who can pro­
nounce the letter 'r' would express ·with 'She raved at him'. Cases of 
irony or sarcasm furnish somewhat more relevant examples. Thus, in 
some contexts, 'That was an interesting remark' might express what 
one would more straightforwardly express with 1That was a dull 
remark'. Finally, to take a case similar to Surge's dancing example, 
suppose I ask you, 'Why did Professor Jones tty to burn down his 
elementary school when he was 8 years old?' and you reply 
( 14) He did it because he is crazy 
Presumably, the grammatically present-tense 'he is crazy' in ( 14) 
abbreviates something like 'he has always been crazy' or 'he has been 
crazy for a long time'. This is perhaps clearer still when we reflect on 
the oddity of answering 'Why didn't Professor Jones help his class­
mates burn down the school when he was 8 years old?' with 
( 1 5 )  He is very mature 
A different sort of case, purportedly supporting a referential analy­
sis of tenses, is the following. This case is supposed to show that 
tenses can refer to rather specific times. Suppose I ask you, 'Why 
diqn't Mary attend last week's party?', and you reply by saying 
( 16) Mary was sick 
Burge and others have maintained that the past tense in ( 16) refers to 
a specific time in the past - namely, the time of the party. If ( 16) 
were true just in case Mary is sick at some time or other prior to ( 16 )'s 
production, then it could be true even though Mary was not sick at 
the time of the party. But in that case ( 16)  would not be a proper 
reply to the question. Thus, we are told, ( 16) is best understood as 
equivalent to 
( 16') Mary was sick then 
where the demonstrative 'then' is understood to refer to the time of 
the party. 
But in neither this case nor the case of ( 3) must we suppose that 
some (possibly covert) feature of a sentence's tense structure is refer­
ring to a time, simply because that sentence abbreviates another sent­
ence containing explicit temporal references. The equivalence of ( 16) 
and ( 16') in certain situations does not suggest that something in the 
tense structure of ( l6) is doing the job of 'then' in ( 16'). Rather, it 
suggests simply that in those contexts the explicit use of 'then' is 
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unnecessary. The reason we can economize and utter ( 1 6 )  is because 
in context it is clear what we are saying. Given the background of 
shared presuppositions required for the occur-rence of ( 1 6 )  to be 
intelligible and appropriate in the conversational context we are con­
sidering, an explicit reference in ( 1 6 )  to the rime of the parry would 
be gratuitous. The study of the suppression of the demonstrative in 
( 1 6')  thus seems to be a matter for the pragmatic analysis of conversa­
tional contexts, rather than the semantic analysis of tenses. 
Context, then, often supplies information which we can omit from 
our overt pronouncements without hindering communication. Pro­
ponents of referential analyses of tenses apparently overlook this vital 
fact in some cases, and in so doing, attribute more structure to our 
language than it actually has. 
v 
We see, then, that despite our refusal to attribute a referring role to 
tenses, we can still plausibly account for the familiar linguistic epi­
sodes in which this role is allegedly manifest. But denying that tenses 
refer has serious and far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of 
language. We can best see this by considering first just what tenses 
apparently do, given that they do not refer. 
My position on the matter is that tenses are nothing more than very 
general sorts of restrictions placed on sentences' truth-conditions. 
They determine the very general respect(s) in which a sentence's truth 
conditions are relativized to its rime of production.3 For example, 
generally speaking a past-tense sentence of the form 'S was 0' is true 
j ust in case S is 0 prior to its time of production [ the sentence to the 
right of the biconditional is tenseless]. When a sentence ' S was 0' 
abbreviates a sentence 'S was 0 at t ' ,  then the sentence is true if and 
only if S is 0 at t and t is before the sentence's rime of production. 
But in such a case it is not the tense of the sentence that is responsible 
for the increased specificity of these truth-conditions. What is respon­
sible is the modifier 'at t ' ,  the explicit production of which may be 
unnecessary in that context. The past tense of 'S was 0' merely 
imposes a certain general kind of temporal restriction on the senten­
ce's truth-conditions. For the sentence to be true, what it reports 
must occur before its time of production, rather than after or at that 
time, as in the case of the future and present tenses, respectively. 
Of course, in making general claims about tenses and tensed sent­
ences, some abstracting from the intricacies of ordinary discourse is 
inevitable. In fact, the truth-conditions of tensed sentences are rarely 
this straightforward. For example, 'Jones is sick' and 'Jones is smiling' 
might differ in truth-conditions in virtue of the sorts of beliefs about 
being sick and smiling we presuppose in discourse. Consider: 
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how long m ust Jones be in some appropriately abnormal state for a 
replica of 'Jones is sick' to be true? One would imagine al lease as long 
as the sentence's { presumably rather brief) time of production. But if 
Jones' condition Lasts only that long, we might be reluctant to say that 
he was sick. On the other hand, Jones might smile only during the 
sentence's time of producton, and that would be sufficient for an 
ordinary instance of 'Jones is smiling' to be true. But these complica­
tions in the truth-conditions of tensed sentences are due to pragmatic 
presuppositions about being sick and smiling. As in the case of sup­
pressed specific references to times, they are not complications in the 
sentences' tense structure. 
According to this non-referential account of tenses, therefore, 
although the tense of a sentence determines how the sentence's truth­
conditions are relativized to its time of production - that is, whether 
what the sentence reports must occur before, during, or after its time 
of production { or more complicated sorts of relationships as in the 
case of compound tenses) - this is not accomplished by means of 
covert references to times made in the sentences. Granted, in stating a 
tensed sentence's truth-conditions we refer to moments of time. But 
truth-conditions are expressed in a meta-language, and the level of 
abstraction at which we state a sentence's truth-conditions is far 
removed from the everyday contexts in which object-language senten­
ces are usually produced. The statement of a sentences's truth­
conditions deals with the way that sentence functions within a certain 
linguistic context, and there is no reason whatever to insist that every 
temporal reference in the metalinguistic statement of a tensed senten­
ce's truth-conditions corresponds to some temporal reference in the 
associated object-language sentence. Hence, tenses are not like the re­
ferring singular terms ' now' and 'then', which typically refer to times 
in object-language sentences. But once we grant this, we must 
seriously reconsider other widely-held views about language. 
To begin with, we have seen that nonsimultaneous replicas of a 
tensed sentence can have different truth-conditions but express the 
same thing. For example, successive replicas of 
( 1 )  J . F.K. was assassinated 
produced at moments M and M', can express the same thing, as we 
know from ordinary discourse. But the replica produced at M is true 
j ust in case J.F.K. is assassinated before M, while the later replica is 
true j ust in case J .F.K. is assassinated before M'. Thus the period of 
time in which J .F.K. must be assassinated for a replica of ( 1 )  to be 
true changes from M to M'. In this respect, the replicas of ( 1 )  have 
different truth-conditions. But while this change appears minimal, it is 
nevertheless significant, since it is this variability of truth-conditions 
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which enables the replicas to differ m truth,value - for example, 
when J .F .K .  is assassinated sometime between M andM'. In any case, 
since replicas of ( 1 )  expressing the same thing can differ in truth, 
conditions, we must abandon the familiar view that a change in a 
sentence's truth-conditions determines a corresponding change in 
what it expresses 
Taking a non,referential approach to tenses may also force us to 
reconsider another of the familiar views about propositions menti, 
oned at the beginning of this paper - namely, that propositions have 
truth,values. We know from ordinary Language use that nonsimul, 
taneous replicas of a tensed sentence like ( 1 )  can express the same 
thing. But we also know that these replicas have different truth, 
conditions and can differ in truth,value. But what about the proposi, 
tions they express? If the sentences express the same proposition, and 
if propositions have truth,values, then we would presumably be in the 
awkward position of claiming that a true and a false sentence can both 
express the same true (or false) proposition. We also saw that pairs of 
contradictory sentences can have the same truth,value. What do we 
say about this? Do contradictory tensed sentences express contradic, 
tory propositions? If so, and if contradictory propositions have 
opposing truth,values (as one would expect), then if two false senten, 
ces (say) are contradictories, one of these false sentences will express a 
true proposition. 
The peculiarity of these claims is perhaps not reason enough for 
rejecting the view that propositions have truth,values. It may be intel, 
ligible to say (for example) that a false sentence can express a true 
proposition (though I doubt it). But once we grant (say) that contra, 
dictory sentences can have the same truth,value, it is far from clear 
that there is anything to be gained by assigning truth,values to the 
things sentences express. So long as we continue to maintain that a 
sentence is true when its truth,conditions are satisfied, then the truth, 
conditions of sentences would not be correlated in any straightfor, 
ward way with the truth,conditions of the propositions which the 
sentences express. We would, in fact, have to provide two theories of 
truth, one for sentences, and another for propositions. And the latter, 
it appears, would be implausibly independent of the former. 
l suppose some might argue that the need for two such theories of 
truth is precisely what we should expect. After all, they might say, 
since a sentence is a kind of linguistic a1enc, and since what a sentence 
expresses is not, why should we expect to be able to correlate their 
truth,conditions in any neat way - if, indeed, they may be correlated 
at all? In fact, we should remember that propositions have tradition, 
ally been regarded as language,independent in some significant 
respect. That is why philosophers have wanted to say, for example, 
that the proposition that 7 is a prime number is true whether or not 
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I shall not attempt to resolve this issue here. Even so, we can at 
least see that a decision in favor of treating propositions as ttuth­
bearers will not restore our familiar account of the relationship 
between sentences and propositions, since on the traditional account 
sentences have the same truth,value as the propositions they express. 
Often, on these accounts, sentences are taken to have truth-values 
derivately, rather than primitively. That is, propositions are regarded 
as the primary truth-bearers, and sentences are true or false only 
insofar as they express true or false propositions, respectively. But 
this approach turns on the plausibility of the view that a change in a 
sentence's truth-conditions determines a corresponding change in 
proposition expressed - a view which I have tried to show in unte, 
nable. lf my observations about tenses and their role in agreement are 
correct, then, we have persuasive reasons for abandoning this picture 
of the relationship between sentential and propositional truth-value. 
Indeed, we have grounds for rethinking seriously the concept of a 
proposition. If propositions, the things sentences express, are not the 
sorts of things that have truth,values, what kinds of things are they? 
Here, we come to one of the deeper issues lurking beneath the surface 
of this paper; let me comment on it briefly. I suggest that we should 
not take too literally the pre-theoretical intuition that sentences 
express things (whether or not we call these things (propositions'), or 
that a sentence means something. Although these are very natural 
ways to describe what sentences do, they foster the illusion that the 
successful use of a sentence does some thing which we can then des­
cribe in a reasonably exhaustive or complete way. Although l cannot 
defend the view here, I suggest that the meaning of (or proposition 
expressed by) a sentence is no more clearly or exhaustively specifiable 
than would be the humor or sensitivity of a sentence ... How a sentence 
is humorous or sensitive can be roughly and incompletely specified by 
choosing some description of the context in which the sentence is 
produced. But little more can be said about what a sentence means or 
expresses. We can offer some description of the context in which the 
sentence is produced, and thereby point to certain features of its use 
- e.g., how it is a response to what preceded it, what effect it pro­
duced, etc. But such accounts are fated to be incomplete, and ulti­
mately no more precise than the bit of language they are intended to 
explicate. We can say what a sentence means or expresses only by 
producing another sentence, and at no point can we fall back on a bit 
of language whose meaning is any more precisely explicable than the 
one we wanted to explain initially. 
But if it is a mistake to suppose that what a sentence expresses is 
exact or clearly specifiable, then perhaps one reason nonsimultaneous 
replicas of a tensed sentence can so easily express the same thing is 
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that sentences generally do not express something precise. The convo­
luted attempts examined earlier to explain how tensed sentences can 
express the same thing OT contradict one another ( e.g. , by means of 
reference to the same specious present) are simply examples of the 
sort of theorizing one tends to engage in by supposing that natural 
languages are kinds of calculi, more or less precise vehicles for com­
municating. Of course, philosophers have for some time been arguing 
that this general approach to language is deeply mistaken. The forego­
i ng discussion is merely an attempt to make the same point in a dif­
ferent way.5  
Notes 
1 Buridan comes to di.scussing them in his Sophisms (my cases are modeled after 
so� o( those he presents - see Scott, 1 966 ). But Buridan resolutely refuses to 
abandon the traditional concept of contradictories, as well as the view that tenses 
refer. He also seems to embrace the view that we use tenses to refer to a specious 
present (see, e.g .• chapt. 7, sophism 3 ). 
2 Contrary to what some have believed, not all tensed sentences can change in 
truth-value with time. See Braude, 1973.  
1 See Braude, 1 97 3  for an explanation of this position from a somewhat different 
point of view. 
• For a good defense of this view, see Goldberg, 1 982. Also, Braude, 1 979: 1 52-
1 74, 205££. 
� I am grateful to many people for stimulating and helpful discussions of this 
topic, and for criticisms of ancestors of this paper. ln particular I wish to thank 
Bruce Goldberg, Scott Weinstein, Alan Tormey, Tyler Burge, and Steven Davis. 
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